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Abstract
Studies of selective exposure have focused on use of traditional media sources. However, discussion networks are an inte-
gral part of individuals’ information diets. This article extends the selective exposure literature by exploring the potential
for networks to likewise be selectively accessed. A pre-registered experiment found that participants nominate denser,
more ideologically coherent networks in response to congenial political news relative to uncongenial news, and express
willingness to share it with more people. Analysis of open-ended data suggest shared political beliefs are more likely to
motivate discussant selection in response to congenial, rather than uncongenial, news. Properties of networks generated
in response to political and non-political news did not vary. These results provide nuance to our understanding of political
information exposure.
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1. Introduction
An established body of literature has grappled with the
tendency of individuals to selectively expose themselves
to pro-attitudinal information, focusing on media con-
tent (Stroud, 2011). As individuals interact with identity-
threatening information (e.g., political topics), they en-
gage in biased search, seeking out information that bol-
sters their group’s positions (Stroud, 2011). Ultimately
though, studies of this phenomenon have operational-
ized information seeking behavior in terms of media use,
considering only the causes and consequences of expo-
sure to mediated messages. However, discussion net-
works serve as essential sources in individuals’ personal-
ized information environments. Discussion networks are
comprised of the set of all social contacts with which
an individual discusses a range of issues, including but
not limited to politics (Klofstad, McClurg, & Rolfe, 2009).
Researchers may have shied away from examining net-
works as dependent variables in such studies of selective
exposure because they are often thought of as static enti-
ties, of whose information individuals are passive recipi-
ents (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009, p. 21). However, recent stud-
ies in organizational behavior (Menon & Smith, 2014;
Smith, Menon, & Thompson, 2012) have shown that the
activated portions of much larger latent networks are in-
deed guided by context and psychological states. This
opens networks up to be seen as the outcomes of par-
tisan selective exposure.
This project explores the potential for subsets of
an individual’s discussion network to be selectively ac-
cessed as information sources, based on situationalmoti-
vations or psychological states. One reason this selectiv-
ity is increasingly important to understand is in light of
large proportions of the public using social networking
sites, because these sites enable maintaining and access-
ing larger networks containing more weak ties (Ellison,
Steinfield, & Lampe, 2011). If individuals are able to
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choose from a broader range of contacts for discussion,
there is more potential for situational selectivity driven
by the characteristics of a given news story.
The approach undertaken here also adds nuance to
existing discussion network research that has overlooked
situational variation. Such outcomes would be relevant
to democratic functioning, because certain policy issues
or news story characteristicsmay encourage different ap-
proaches to network activation, and thus produce differ-
ent provisions of socially mediated information. Extend-
ing the basic theory behind selective media exposure to
this domain, the congeniality of an issue may drive indi-
viduals to seek additional opinions from a broader or nar-
rower subset of their discussion contacts.
Using a pre-registered experiment, I show how is-
sue congeniality can shapediscussion network activation.
These results should broaden how researchers conceptu-
alize partisan selective exposure. As individuals increas-
ingly maintain discussion contacts online, and partisan
media choices proliferate online (e.g., Brady, Crockett,
& Van Bavel, 2019), the potential for selective network
activation in response to political news warrants fur-
ther attention.
2. Theory
2.1. Selective Exposure: From Media to Discussion
Research on selective exposure stretches back decades
(Berelson, Gaudet, & Lazarsfeld, 1944; Zillmann&Bryant,
1985). In recent years, transformations in the media en-
vironment have reinvigorated work in the area, focus-
ing on the effects of increased audience control and a
fragmented media landscape (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008;
Brundidge, 2010;	Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Stroud, 2011).
However, findings about the potential for increasing se-
lective exposure over time remain mixed (Guess, Nyhan,
Lyons, & Reifler, 2018).
Importantly, though, citizens consult sources other
than news media when forming and reinforcing their un-
derstanding of the political world. Interpersonal discus-
sion is an equally important component in the flow of
political communication (Katz, 1957; McLeod, Scheufele,
& Moy, 1999; Moy & Gastil, 2006). Discussion is in many
ways aided by the current proliferation of social net-
work sites, enabling consultationwith a broader network
containing more latent, weak ties (Ellison, Steinfield, &
Lampe, 2007). But just as importantly, individuals may
exhibit partisan selectivity in accessing these other, non-
news sources as well. The key contribution of this arti-
cle is addressing selectivity in the broader set of informa-
tion channels citizens access. Specifically, this article ad-
dresses a form of second-step selectivity that occurs af-
ter media exposure, whenmedia content is digested and
reflected upon through discussion (Shah et al., 2017).
Researchers should include discussion networks in ex-
aminations of selectivity, then, because not only do they
comprise one of the two key components of the polit-
ical communication ecosystem, but because individuals
think of partisan media and partisan group members in
much the same way; both are seen through the same
partisan lens (Stroud, Muddiman, & Lee, 2014). In other
words,media outlets and discussion partners are thought
of (and potentially selected) in many of the same ways.
2.2. Discussion Networks and Contextual Activation
Interpersonal networks serve as critical sources of infor-
mation, with both denser network structures, wherein
more of the contacts know one another (i.e., net-
work density; Granovetter, 1973) and greater similarity
among members (i.e., network homogeneity; Huckfeldt,
Mendez, & Osborn, 2004) ultimately degrading informa-
tion availability (Klar & Shmargad, 2017) and quality of
thought. Homogenous networks strengthen and evenpo-
larize concordant opinions, though these protected, af-
firming pockets of like-mindedness can instil more pas-
sion to participate in the political process. Disagreement
within personal networks likely has several beneficial out-
comes. It can increase tolerance by depolarizing feel-
ings about in and out-groups (Parsons, 2010). Anticipa-
tion of future disagreement can drive an information
search for new material (Eveland, 2004). It can increase
knowledge and sophistication through increased expo-
sure to diverse or novel information, and can in turn
strengthen one’s arguments. It increases understanding
of both one’s own position and the rationales support-
ing the opposition’s. This can in turn lead to higher lev-
els of persuasion (Barabas, 2004; Gastil & Dillard, 1999;
Huckfeldt et al., 2004; Levitan & Visser, 2008; Mutz,
2002; Scheufele, Nisbet, Brossard, & Nisbet, 2004).
Although networks are conceptually recognized as dy-
namic phenomena, most studies measure their composi-
tion and antecedents as static (Klein, Saltz, &Mayer, 2004;
McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Brashears, 2006; Sasovova,
Mehra, Borgatti, & Schippers, 2010). Instead of consis-
tently activating the same discussants in every context,
however, individuals seek different components of their
far-larger latent network based on conscious or uncon-
scious motivations (Menon & Smith, 2014). Because in-
dividuals’ sense of who they are shifts situationally (for
example, when their partisan identity is threatened by
uncongenial information), “so too does their mental rep-
resentation of their social networks,” (Menon & Smith,
2014, p. 117; Smith et al., 2012). Rather than being strate-
gic in network activation, Menon and Smith (2014) argue
that patterns of activation depend on underlying psycho-
logical states. The congeniality of a media message may
alter these states (Hasell & Weeks, 2016).
2.3. News Content’s Potential to Shape Network
Activation
It has long been acknowledged that information flows
from mass media through media audiences and on to
interpersonal discussion networks (Katz, 1957). The ar-
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gument made here is that it does so differentially based
on media content. Individuals not only selectively share
which content to consume based on valence, but subse-
quently selectively choose who to discuss it with based
on its valence.
Givenmedia that is congenial or uncongenial to one’s
views, how does the second step of flow proceed—
through congenial or uncongenial discussion partners?
Some prior work suggests congenial political news might
be discussed more often with co-partisans. Individuals
may seek to strengthen bonds with those with whom
they already consistently agree (Ellison et al., 2007). In
complementary fashion, news consumers may share un-
congenial news with dissimilar discussants in an effort to
cater to that discussant’s tastes (Atkin, 1972; Lerner &
Tetlock, 1999).
However, other work that examines news sharing
and proselytizing behaviors could suggest the opposite—
that individuals would be more likely to discuss news
casting their preferred party in a flattering light more
broadly overall, and more frequently with out-partisans,
specifically. One reason for this may be schadenfreude,
or happiness at the misfortune of others. Some news
consumers may look to spread news of a politician’s
embarrassment to gloat in the face of their out-party
social contacts (Crysel & Webster, 2018). Another rea-
son individuals may share news they find congenial with
out-partisans is with aim of persuading them (Thorson,
2014). Congenial news may be seen as potentially per-
suasive ammunition in ongoing deliberations among so-
cial contacts with discordant views. This is supported by
evidence that cable news viewers—who are more likely
to see likeminded content—proselytize more often than
other news viewers (Platzman, 2015).
3. Hypotheses and Research Questions
Do individuals nominate more or less ideologically ho-
mogenous discussion networks, or more or less dense
networks, based on the political congeniality of the news
article? Do these network characteristics vary between
political and non-political issue cues? This study com-
pares discussion network activation for a variety of top-
ics, using a pre-registered experiment (see osf.io/2xv9q/
?view_only=9005ea7a577443f797a962edeedca7a2 for
hypotheses, questionnaire, stimuli, and analysis plan).
I test two key aspects of news that might drive echo
chamber dynamics: attitudinal congeniality and political
vs non-political content.
First, I examine response to pro- and counter-
attitudinal fact-checks of Donald Trump. Some research
suggests that pro-attitudinal news ismore likely to be dis-
cussed with one’s in-group to stimulate bonding (Ellison
et al., 2007). However, studies on selective sharing (An,
Quercia, & Crowcroft, 2014; Aruguete & Calvo, 2018),
particularly regarding congenial and uncongenial fact-
checks (Shin & Thorson, 2017), suggest that individu-
als will be more likely to discuss “good news,” (rather
than “bad news”) about their party with the other side,
whether to persuade or to gloat and self-gratify (Crysel
& Webster, 2018).
H1. Pro-attitudinal fact-checks will produce less
dense, less politically homogenous network subsets
than counter-attitudinal fact-checks.
I then examine response to three non-political topics.
These comprise two hard news and one soft news topic,
with hard news varying in its degree of controversy—
vaccine hesitancy, self-driving cars, and popular films.
I expect political views will not motivate network acti-
vation for these issues. It’s less clear how the density of
networks might be affected. The literature is unclear as
to whether political or non-political topics will produce
denser networks. I also check for any key differences
amongst the set of non-political topics.
H2. Non-political issueswill produce less politically ho-
mogenous networks than political issues.
RQ1. Is there any difference in the density of networks
produced by political and non-political issue cues?
RQ2. Do non-political topics’ networks differ fromone
another in density or homogeneity?
Prior to the network properties I analyse, I first ask a ba-
sic “reach” question—how widely would you share this
news? I expect pro-attitudinal news will have greater
reach than counter attitudinal news. I am agnostic about
any other differences in this outcome.
H3. Pro-attitudinal fact-checks will have greater reach
than counter-attitudinal fact-checks.
3.1. Planned Exploratory Analyses
Finally, I include an open-ended prompt for participants
to describe their selection motivations in their own
words. I later present these responses in an exploratory
analysis. I also conduct exploratory tests of the moderat-
ing roles of political interest and strength of partisanship.
4. Methods
4.1. Sample and Design
Participants (N = 1,872) were recruited through Amazon
Mechanical Turk in February 2019. They were paid $.90
and completed the experiment in an average of 4.80min-
utes (SD = 4.54). Participants were 55.65% male, 79.5%
white, with a mean age of 36.76 (SD = 11.27), and me-
dian education of a bachelor’s degree. Including “lean-
ers,” 56.3% were Democrats, 32.26% were Republicans,
and 11.45% were independents. In terms of Trump sup-
port, 34.83% supported him “somewhat” or “strongly”.
They first provided demographic information before
being randomly assigned to view the headline and pre-
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view image for one of seven news articles. These arti-
cles included four fact-checks of Donald Trump drawn
from Politifact—two with “True” ratings and two with
“False” ratings, and three non-political news articles,
also drawn from real sources, concerning self-driving car
safety (from The Telegraph), the dangers of the anti-
vaccination movement (from The Independent), and the
50 best comedies of the century (from Rolling Stone).
They were then asked a series of questions about with
whom they would discuss the news story, which served
as outcome measures.
4.2. Measures
4.2.1. Independent Variables
For those exposed to a fact-check article, congenial-
ity is calculated by taking the slant of article (Trump
“True” statements are Pro-Republican, Trump “False”
statements are Pro-Democrat) crossed with respondent
party (Republican/Democrat), resulting in scores of −1
(uncongenial, N= 485) or 1 (congenial, N= 456). Because
I am interested in the effects of congeniality, I do not
include Independents in these analyses. I conduct sup-
plementary analyses in which they are included. I also
conduct a robustness check in which I substitute Trump
support in the place of party in the congeniality calcula-
tion (Trump support is 4-pt., centered: −2, −1, 1, 2, and
crossed with slant). Other indicator variables were con-
structed using treatment assignment (i.e., a “Vaccines”
indicator, a “Self-driving cars” indicator, and a “Movies”
indicator based on assignment to these articles).
4.2.2. Dependent Variables
Reach (M = 1.11, SD = .92) was gauged by asking “How
many people would you share this news with?” (4 pt.,
0 = “none,” 3 = “a lot.”).
Cognitive network activation was again gauged using
measures drawing on the GSS network battery. Partici-
pants were asked to provide up to 5 discussion partners,
the strength of ties among these (0, 1, 2), the political
ideology of each (1 = very liberal, 7 = very conservative),
and the party affiliation of each (Democrat, Republican,
something else).
Network density is again calculated by summing the
strength of ties and dividing by total possible ties of each
respondent’s network. The resulting measure (M = 2.27,
SD = .60) ranged from 1 to 3.
Network homogeneity (Makse & Sokhey, 2014) takes
the average of the alters’ party affiliation agreement
with respondent party (e.g., when respondent is Repub-
lican and alter is Republican = 1, when alter is Demo-
crat or other = 0). The average (M = .56, SD = .41) thus
ranges from 0 to 1. As an alternate measure of homo-
geneity, I measure network coherence. In all hypothe-
ses regarding network homogeneity, I refer to both mea-
sures. For network coherence (Erisen & Erisen, 2012),
I use reported ideology of each contact measured on
a 1–7 scale, and the participant’s self-reported ideology
from the same scale. I then take the absolute value of the
ideological distance between the participant and each
contact and average the distances to find the political co-
herence of the network from the perspective of the par-
ticipant. Coherence (M = 1.32, SD = 1.09) ranges from 0
to 6. To aid in interpretation, I multiply coherence by −1,
so that participants with more ideologically similar alters
score higher.
4.2.3. Moderators
Strength of partisanship (1 = strong, M = .42, SD = .49),
and political interest (5 pt., 5 = “very interested,”
M = 3.32, SD = 1.08) were measured as potential mod-
erating variables.
5. Results
5.1. Congeniality Effects on Network Properties
All analyses were conducted using OLS regression. H1
stated that pro-attitudinal fact-checks would produce
less dense, less politically homogenous network subsets
than counter-attitudinal fact-checks. Accordingly, I fit a
series of OLS regressions, one for each of the three net-
work properties, with congeniality as the independent
variable. These models include all participants who were
assigned to one of the political (fact-check) conditions.
Additionally, as the focus is on network properties, only
participants who provided more than 1 alter could be in-
cluded. 225 partisans said they would discuss the news
with 1 or 0 others and were thus excluded from these
network property models. The results are depicted in
Figure 1. Congenial news exposure produced denser dis-
cussion networks (b = .05, p = .028), and networks that
were more coherent—or ideologically similar to the par-
ticipant (b = .10, p = .008). There was no effect on the
measure of network homogeneity derived from binary
partisanship (b = .01, p = .316). All analyses were robust
to the inclusion of question fixed effects to account for
specific article assignment.
5.2. Political vs. Non-Political News Effects on Network
Properties
H2 stated that non-political issueswould produce less po-
litically homogenous networks than political issues. RQ1
asked if there are there any differences in the density
of networks produced by political and nonpolitical issue
cues. These models include the article-assignment indi-
cator variables—vaccines, self-driving cars, andmovies—
as independent variables. The fact-check conditions are
left out as the reference category. Results show no sig-
nificant differences in network properties between polit-
ical and non-political content. RQ2 asked if non-political
topics’ networks differ from one another in density or
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Figure 1. News congeniality effects on discussion network properties. Notes: network density is based on the average
strength of ties among all alters (N = 661). Network homogeneity is based on shared partisan affiliation between partic-
ipants and alters (N = 786). Network coherence is based on average ideological distance of alters from the participant
(N = 786).
homogeneity. Models addressing this question included
all participants assigned to non-political stimuli, with
the “movies” article left out as the reference category.
Again, there were no significant differences across non-
political content.
5.3. Effects on Reach
H3 stated that pro-attitudinal fact-checks would have
greater reach than counter-attitudinal fact-checks. To ad-
dress this question, the previous model restriction to
participants providing at least 2 alters was lifted. Partic-
ipants reported intention to share pro-attitudinal news
more widely, b= .08, p= .008. However, all non-political
news stories (vaccines, b= .46, p< .001, self-driving cars,
b = .27, p < .001, and movies, b = .24, p < .001) gener-
ated greater willingness to share more widely than did
political stories, as shown in Figure 2.
5.4. Exploratory Analyses
Planned exploratory analysis of political interest’s poten-
tial moderating role was conducted using OLS regression,
replicating the models used to test H1, with the addition
of the moderating variable and the interaction term of
interest and congeniality. Results show political interest
moderated the effect of congeniality on network homo-
geneity and network coherence such that congeniality’s
effect on these was greater among high-interest parti-
sans and lesser among low-interest partisans. There was
no interaction in the density model. The congeniality-
interest interactions are depicted in Figure 3. The same
tests were conducted using strength of partisanship in
the place of interest. There were no significant interac-
tions, though the effects of congeniality were robust to
the inclusion of strength of partisanship in the model.
I also conducted two planned robustness tests (one
additional planned robustness test, in which trait net-
work similarity would be included as a covariate, was not
conducted as themeasurewas not included in the online
questionnaire in error). First, Trump support was used
in the place of partisanship in construction of the con-
geniality indicator. The results were substantively simi-
lar. Using the Trump-support congeniality indicator, pro-
attitudinal news still produced denser networks (b = .04,
p = .005), had no effect on homogeneity (b = .00,
p = .674), produced more ideologically coherent net-
works (though the effect was weaker, b = .04, p = .073),
and generated greater reach (b= .04, p= .020). Next, be-
cause the research was motivated by questions of selec-
tive exposure, only partisans were included in the above
analyses. Separate analyses were conducted using the
full sample, including independents. These models pro-
duced substantively identical results.
Finally, I conducted an exploratory analysis of open-
ended responses concerning selection motivation. This
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Condional Marginal Eﬀects of Congeniality Across Interest, with 95% CIs
1
–2
–1.5
–1
–.5
0
.5
1
2 3
Polical Interest
Eﬀ
ec
ts
 o
n 
Li
ne
ar
 P
re
di
c
on
 (N
et
w
or
k 
H
om
og
en
ei
ty
)
4 5 1
–2
–1.5
–1
–.5
0
.5
1
2 3
Polical Interest
Eﬀ
ec
ts
 o
n 
Li
ne
ar
 P
re
di
c
on
 (N
et
w
or
k 
Co
he
re
nc
e)
4 5
Figure 3. News congeniality effect on network homogeneity and coherence, across political interest. Notes: network ho-
mogeneity is based on shared partisan affiliation between participants and alters. Network coherence is based on average
ideological distance of a network from the participant. Both N = 786.
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analysis focused on partisans in the political news condi-
tions in order to examine potential differences driven by
congeniality (N = 941; after filtering for N/A responses,
N = 821). An initial assessment of the responses sug-
gested the 11 motivations depicted in Table 1. Many re-
spondents said discussants were chosen because they
were close friends and family (N = 265) or habitual po-
litical discussants (N = 135), or they were generally com-
fortable discussing politics with the discussant (N = 70).
Many respondents also said they chose no one because
they don’t discuss politics in general (N = 90). Still, a
good number of respondents indicated that their selec-
tions were based on more situational factors. Logistic re-
gression models predicting each motivation by the news
article’s congeniality show that those exposed to conge-
nial news were more likely to select discussants based
on shared political views (OR = 1.33, p = .022). On the
other hand, those exposed to congenial content were
less likely to say they selected “no discussant” due to
content-specific reasons (those exposed to uncongenial
news were more likely to do so) (OR = .77, p = .021).
Those expressing this motivation often doubted the ve-
racity of the uncongenial news item (e.g., “fake news”).
6. Discussion
This study found that participants nominate denser and
more cohesive sets of discussion partners in response
to pro-attitudinal news, or conversely, that counter-
attitudinal news may be shared with more diverse sub-
sets. In other words, at least regarding news centering
on claimsmade by Trump, individuals appear to bemore
eager to share pro-attitudinal news with co-partisans,
particularly those in their inner circle. Notably, this find-
ing is the opposite of the hypothesized effect of conge-
niality. One potential account for these results is that
participants are not interested in persuading out-party
members with news that may disconfirm their prior be-
liefs, but instead looking to reinforce bonds over agree-
able news stories with those with whom they already
know they agree (Ellison et al., 2007). And on the other
hand, readers may choose to discuss counter-attitudinal
news more broadly in an effort to cater to those (more-
distant) audiences’ differing tastes (Lerner & Tetlock,
1999). More broadly, readers are more likely to attend
to news with cues that others will be interested; there
is a social utility gratification of the information (Atkin,
1972). Therefore, social utility may help explain the re-
sults. These accounts, especially the former, are some-
what supported in the open-ended data.
Notably, though, participants reported interest in
sharing pro-attitudinal news with more people. Differen-
tial effects of political versus non-political content on net-
work properties were limited, but participants reported
willingness to share non-political content more widely
overall. When given the option, most people prefer to
opt out of political news (Guess et al., 2018). Finally, I find
that political interest moderates the effects of congenial-
ity such that more interested partisans nominate denser,
more cohesive networks in response to pro-attitudinal
content, while those low in interest nominate broader,
less ideologically coherent networks in response. In each
case, these finding track with evidence on the greater
prevalence of echo chambers among the most highly en-
gaged partisans (Guess et al., 2018).
The study also has important limitations. This study’s
political news stimuli center on President Trump, which
might uniquely shape discussion, even relative to other
affect-laden political content. Still, the stimuli are an ac-
curate representation of contemporaneous political dis-
cussion topics; veracity of claims made by polarizing
politicians on the national stage are now a centerpiece
of public discourse. Moreover, it is important to note
that this study cannot ascertain the quality, diversity, or
depth of the conversation yielded by differential degrees
of density or homogeneity in the respondents’ networks.
Table 1. Open-ended responses for network selection motivations as predicted by news congeniality.
Congeniality regression
Motivation Uncongenial Congenial Total Odds ratio
Close friend/family 131 134 265 1.04 (.08)
Habitual political discussant 58 77 135 1.20 (.11)
Comfort with discussant 38 32 70 .92 (.12)
Expertise 15 17 32 1.08 (.20)
Interest to discussant 38 31 69 .91 (.11)
Diverse views 17 10 27 .77 (.16)
Shared beliefs 28 46 74 1.33 (.17)*
No one—no political discussion 14 12 26 .94 (.19)
No one—not this topic 56 34 90 .77 (.09)*
Inform/persuade 4 6 10 1.24 (.40)
Other 17 6 23
Total 416 405 821
Notes: *= p< .05. N= 821. Column 2–4: frequencies. Column 5: odds ratio for congeniality predicting eachmotivation based on logistic
regression.
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However, overall, these findings help establish that news
topics shape discussion networks.
7. Conclusion: Understanding Information Processes in
a Socially Mediated Age
These results show that accessing networks is often sit-
uationally contingent (though this may be either strate-
gic or subconscious). Hence, a discussion network may
sometimes serve as an echo chamber and sometimes
as a more diverse source. Studies using a single-shot
self-reported network item, or constructing a network
from trace data, may elide the fact that only certain sub-
sets are activated for different discussions and this varies
with social and informational cues. These findings sug-
gest that discussion networks are endogenous to media
use and not simply a static, independent factor moderat-
ing its effects on attitudes, knowledge, and other behav-
ior. Building on these findings, selective exposuremodels
should incorporate both discussion andmedia use, exam-
ining their interplay through a reinforcing spirals frame-
work (Slater, 2007).
For this reason, there are unique implications of con-
textual network activation for affective polarization and
knowledge. Contextually activated discussion networks
are consequential for the person processing the news,
but also for his or her alters—both in their exposure to in-
formation and in the social conditions under which they
are exposed (Druckman, Levendusky, & McLain, 2018).
Indeed, partisans may selectively discuss political con-
tent with others, but this should not be understood as
a one-way street of selectivity. Partisans are selectively
exposing themselves and others to congenial responses
when they choose to “share.”
The fact that political talk is a two-way street—
wherein individuals activate contacts to seek their opin-
ions but also to shape them—warrants more attention
in future research. The current work cannot interrogate
these processes, instead only seeking to establish that
political discussion unfolds in a manner compatible with
the tenets of selective exposure. However, additional
studies may examine the effects of selective network ac-
tivation, in terms of the quality and diversity of informa-
tion that is ultimately accessed, and the downstream ef-
fects of this selective two-step flow on those not directly
exposed to a given media message (e.g., Aruguete, &
Calvo, 2018; Carlson, 2018; Druckman et al., 2018).
Further, future work should examine the effects of
homogenous social settings (e.g., if an individual is em-
bedded in a partisan echo chamber in their social net-
work platform of choice), which maymake group threats
more salient and drive activation of network contacts ac-
cordingly. Conversely, a social setting that provides re-
minders of an individual’s wide variety of social circles
may spur contact with a more diverse set of discussants.
Examining these questions of social context matter be-
cause news exposure is socially embedded (Ahmadi &
Wohn, 2018; Barnidge, 2017; Lee & Kim, 2017).
This study was largely exploratory, examining
whether content cues would shape networks. Replica-
tions and extensions are needed. However, they provide
a basis from which considering discussion network ac-
tivation and taking seriously the role of cues and mo-
tivations will enrich our understanding of how citizens
(selectively) engage with the political world.
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